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so often requires significant time and monetary investments. To understand the trade-offs involved in
deciding when to hire the first employee and how hiring differs in entrepreneurial settings from more
established firm settings, we present a simple growth model that depends on two critical inputs for
revenue generation: the entrepreneur’s time and money. We show that without hiring, the entrepreneur’s
time eventually becomes more valuable than money in contributing to the firm’s growth. In that context,
the value of the employee is driven by how much relief he provides to the entrepreneur. We characterize
the optimal timing of hiring in terms of the firm’s cash position and how the firm is affected if it requires
an upfront fixed investment in time and/or money. We find that the upfront investment in time needed for
hiring cannot be converted to an equivalent upfront investment in money and that mistiming hiring can be
very costly, especially when these upfront investments are high.
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Entrepreneurs need to invest money and time to grow their firms. Both money and time are often scarce, but
the nature of these two resources is fundamentally different. Considering a small, fast-growing entrepreneurial
firm, we show that the firm’s key bottleneck resource shifts from money to time as the firm grows, and
we characterize hiring as an operational mechanism for trading money for time to accelerate growth. The
optimal time for entrepreneurs to hire their first employee occurs as soon as their available cash is sufficiently
large, in order to alleviate the time bottleneck. We show that the cash threshold determined from a one-step
look-ahead policy is optimal when growth is deterministic and performs well even when that is not the case.
We find that hiring costs delay hiring, whereas hiring times may either delay or expedite hiring, because of
the non-trivial tradeoff between the need to preserve the growth momentum and the need to hire before the
opportunity cost of time becomes too large. Hence, time and money should be managed as distinct resources
in growth-oriented firms.
Key words : Entrepreneurial Operations, Capacity Investment, Hiring, Bottleneck, Dynamic Programming,
Supermodularity, Heuristic.

“There are only three fundamental resources you will be working with to achieve your
entrepreneurial goals: time, people, and money. As an entrepreneur, you can usually trade one
for the others.” (Burgstone and Murphy 2012, Breakthrough Entrepreneurship, p. 156)

1.

Introduction

For many entrepreneurs presented with a growth opportunity, realizing that growth is not without
challenges. The firm often lacks the necessary resources and faces a realistic possibility of imminent
failure (Hamermesh et al. 2005). Scaling the business and capitalizing on the growth opportunity
during this phase strongly depends on the entrepreneur’s ability to manage the firm’s limited
resources.
1

Author: The Time-Money Trade-Off for Entrepreneurs
Article submitted to ; manuscript no. (Please, provide the mansucript number!)

2

Among the scarce resources, two particularly fundamental ones are money and time. A phase of
high growth puts severe pressure on the entrepreneur’s financial resources (Hambrick and Crozier
1985) and many entrepreneurs are unable to scale their business due to funding difficulties (Evans
and Jovanovic 1989). To fund their growth, many firms reinvest their earnings (Ebben and Johnson
2006) and often borrow the necessary funds (Berger and Udell 1998). At the same time, as the firm
expands, an increasing number of tasks require the entrepreneur’s attention, now putting pressure
on her time and processing capacity (Gifford 1992). Some activities cannot be easily delegated, so
entrepreneurs often find themselves becoming the bottleneck resource of their firms (Martin and
Papadimitriou 2009). When the entrepreneur’s time is the bottleneck, hiring can be viewed as a
way to alleviate that constraint so as to sustain the firm’s growth, as illustrated by the following
quote: “Typically, when a company is founded by a group of motivated and bright individuals, the
founding team is involved in most aspects of the company’s operations in the early days . . . as the
company grows, it must hire new employees, because the founding team is capacity constrained and
does not have the bandwidth to be involved in all aspects of the company operations” (Krishnan
2013, p. 3).
While time and money are both necessary resources for growth, they are inherently different. In
this paper we explore how entrepreneurs can trade time and money, and explore the consequences
of the inherent asymmetry between the two. First, money, unlike time, is fungible. Whereas money
can be accumulated (or borrowed) across periods, time is only available in a limited budget each
period (e.g., 30 days per month) and is perishable. Although activities can be shifted between
periods, leftover time cannot be stored nor can extra time be created. Second, the result of the
firm’s core activity is money, not time. The output of the firm in one period can be reinvested into
the firm in the form of money in the next period but not in the form of time. To better manage the
two resources, one must first understand the implications of these properties of time and money.
How does the severity of the time and money constraints evolve during the growth phase? To
address this question, we introduce a finite-horizon growth model for entrepreneurial firms in which
revenue in each period is a function of two complementary inputs: money and time. The constraint
on time represents the amount of time that exists each period (e.g., 30 days per month), and the
constraint on money represents the amount of money available in the firm (initial starting capital
and accumulated revenue). We examine the evolution of the shadow prices of time and money
and show that the bottleneck always shifts from money to time, meaning that time will eventually
become more valuable than money as the firm grows, an immediate consequence of the asymmetry
between the two. We introduce hiring as a mechanism to alleviate the time bottleneck (Goldratt
2004), trading off money (wages) for additional time (via delegation) to allow faster growth.
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When should entrepreneurs hire their first employee? Hiring too early or too late can inhibit
growth: “Too often, those who bring the business to the success stage are unsuccessful... either
because they try to grow too fast and run out of cash..., or are unable to delegate effectively enough
to make the company work” (Churchill and Lewis 1983, p. 9). In our context, hiring an employee
represents an agreement to trade off a fixed amount of money for a fixed amount of time each
period for the remainder of the horizon. Moreover, hiring (and training) often entails fixed costs of
money and time, referred to as hiring cost and hiring time, which temporarily slows down the firm’s
growth (Tansky and Heneman 2006, Aldrich and Fiol 1994, Collins and Clark 2003, Williamson
2000). Furthermore, hiring may increase the probability of bankruptcy. In such a setting, with
growth and uncertainty, there is limited guidance on when an entrepreneur should hire.
We define the timing of hiring in terms of a cash threshold defined by the one-stage-look-ahead
(OSLA) rule. We show that this policy is optimal when growth is deterministic and numerically
performs well when that is not the case (Babich and Sobel 2004). The high performance of the
OSLA policy is robust to the problem parameters in our growth setting.
Focusing on the OSLA hiring policy, we examine how various factors influence the timing of
hiring. We find that hiring is delayed when hiring costs are higher. However, greater hiring time
can either expedite or delay hiring, because of two conflicting effects. On the one hand, increased
hiring time diverts more valuable time away from growth activities, which slows growth, pushing
for later hiring. On the other hand, it may be more desirable to incur a larger hiring time when
time is less valuable, pushing for earlier hiring. Hence, time and money should be considered as
distinct resources in growth-oriented firms. We replicate the analysis to investigate the optimal
timing of firing and show that the insights mirror those for hiring. We numerically examine hiring
with and without firing, and find that the option of firing does not materially influence the timing
of hiring.
This paper is organized as follows. We review related literature in §2. In §3, we introduce the
growth model and characterize the shift in bottleneck from money to time. In §4, we present the
hiring model, characterize the OSLA hiring and firing policies separately, study their sensitivity,
and demonstrate their optimality under certain conditions. We show numerically in §5 that the
OSLA policy performs well in general, and we conclude in §6. All proofs appear in the appendix.

2.

Related Literature

We draw on three strands of literature: that on entrepreneurship and growth, the emerging literature on entrepreneurial operations, and that on capacity expansion.
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2.1.

Bottlenecks in Growth-Oriented Entrepreneurial Firms

Firms typically go through several distinct phases in their life cycles from being a start-up to an
established firm, each with its own specific objectives and constraints (Quinn and Cameron 1983).
Typically, entrepreneurial firms initially face considerable uncertainty, and their goal is to learn
and to innovate a viable product while acquiring necessary funding to survive (Jovanovic 1982).
However, once they have learned about their market, true costs, and relative efficiency, the firms’
primary concern becomes centered around growth (Quinn and Cameron 1983).
Maximizing growth during this phase strongly depends on the entrepreneur’s ability to manage
the firm’s limited resources. Some authors identify cash as being the main constraining factor for
growth (e.g., Hambrick and Crozier 1985, Evans and Jovanovic 1989, Ebben and Johnson 2006),
whereas others identify the entrepreneur herself as the main bottleneck (Cressy 1996, Martin and
Papadimitriou 2009), given that growth creates additional demands for the entrepreneur’s attention
and time (Gifford 1992). In line with the latter school of thought, how entrepreneurs allocate their
time has received recent interest from the entrepreneurship literature (Lévesque and Schade 2005,
Mueller et al. 2012). In the same spirit, Yoo et al. (2011) examine how they should allocate their
time between process improvement and revenue growth.
In this paper, we unify the money-focused and time-focused viewpoints by demonstrating that
both time and money are bottlenecks, but at different stages of the firm’s growth. Considering
a similar trade-off, Lévesque and MacCrimmon (1997) investigate how much time entrepreneurs
should allocate to the venture initiation when they have regular hourly wage jobs. Similar to our
model, time and money are assumed to be complementary. In their model, it is the wage job
opportunity, and not hiring, that substitutes time for money. In contrast, we focus here on venture
growth, and not initiation, and consider hiring as a one-time, irreversible decision to increase time;
accordingly, properly timing hiring is key to achieve successful growth.
2.2.

Entrepreneurial Operations and Finance

Many entrepreneurial firms face high uncertainty and lack financial resources, resulting in a high
probability of failure. A growing body of operations management literature on entrepreneurial firms
addresses these key issues.
2.2.1.

Reducing Bankruptcy Probability. Some studies examine how operational deci-

sions can minimize the likelihood of bankruptcy. When the firm’s objective is to maximize survival
probability, Archibald et al. (2002) show that inventory decisions should be more conservative and
Swinney et al. (2011) examine a start-up’s timing of capacity investments when competing against
established firms. Tanrisever et al. (2012) examine the decision to invest in process improvement
under the threat of bankruptcy. Unlike some of these works in which avoiding bankruptcy is the
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objective, we consider bankruptcy as a terminating condition, and our objective is growth, similar
to maximizing the expected value of payoff in IPO (Babich and Sobel 2004).
2.2.2.

Relaxing Financial Constraints. Many studies address the financing challenges

faced by startups and fast growing companies. Buzacott and Zhang (2004) examine how asset-based
financing can be used to manage their operations. Li et al. (2009) acknowledge the considerable
interaction between the operations policy and the financing decisions for cash-constrained small
growing firms and examine the impact of coordinating them. They find that the production and
borrowing policy that maximizes the long-term value of dividends while avoiding bankruptcy is
myopic. We obtain a similar result with the objective of maximizing the firm’s long-term cash
position. Sobel and Turcic (2007) examine how to use credit to better manage resources in nascent
firms and show that the benefit from coordinating finance and operations is greater for smaller
firms. Xu and Birge (2006) show that operational and financial decisions must be made jointly when
capital markets are imperfect, i.e., in the presence of taxes and bankruptcy costs, and Dada and
Hu (2008) and Kouvelis and Zhao (2011) further extend this by considering strategic interactions
between the bank and the firm, and for the latter, a supplier.
We contribute to the literature on financing operations in two ways. First, we consider a nonfungible resource, namely time, as a potential bottleneck in addition to money. In contrast, most
of the literature on financing operations focuses on the interplay between two substitutable and
fungible resources (e.g., cash and inventory). Second, given that the time span of hiring decisions
is typically longer than that of inventory decisions (Holt et al. 1960) we adopt a more tactical
perspective on the operations of entrepreneurial firms.
2.3.

Capacity Expansion and Production Planning

Hiring (and delegating tasks) in small firms increases the available time for the entrepreneur,
enhancing the firm’s capacity to grow. According to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), capacity decisions
share three important characteristics: (i) investments are partially or completely irreversible, (ii)
there exists uncertainty over future rewards, and (iii) there is leeway in the timing of investment.
Our decision of when to hire a permanent employee under uncertainty in future rewards shares
all three characteristics, so it relates to the extensive operations literature on capacity expansion
(Luss 1982, Van Mieghem 2003). This literature typically considers a large firm in which exogenous
demand is assumed to increase, either deterministically (Manne 1961) or stochastically (Luss 1982).
We contribute to this literature by presenting a different type of capacity expansion for growing
firms. First, we allow capacity expansion to cost both time and money, unlike traditional models
in which the expansion cost is purely monetary (Ye and Duenyas 2007). We show that hiring times
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and hiring costs have different effects on the timing of hiring: in the small growing firm setting,
time and money must not be aggregated as is often implicitly done for established firms.
Second, we demonstrate a fundamental bottleneck shift between time (capacity) and money as
the firm grows. Most of the literature on capacity expansion focuses only on capacity as a potential
bottleneck, with a few exceptions that consider both capacity and money. Angelus and Porteus
(2002) characterize the optimal capacity expansion and production plan over a product lifecycle with inventory carry-over. Although finished-good inventories and capacity can be likened to
money and time in our model, they are substitutes, whereas money and time are complementary,
fundamentally changing the nature of the trade-off. By contrast, Babich and Sobel (2004) focus
on the interplay between raw material inventories and manufacturing capacity, which are complementary. We adopt a similar model, but focus on the optimal timing of hiring, whereas they focus
on the optimal timing of an IPO. We complement their model by adopting a more tactical view
on entrepreneurial operations and by demonstrating how the bottleneck shifts from one resource
to another.
Our hiring decision also relates to the rich staffing literature, including the production smoothing
models. Holt et al. (1960) and Bitran et al. (1981) propose a mathematical programming model
to minimize the long-run costs of overtime/idle time and hiring costs under nonstationary deterministic demand. Similarly, we consider here a nonstationary planning horizon in which growth
is expected. See Silver et al. (1998) for a review of aggregate production planning models. The
literature on the operations of staffing considers how many employees to hire taking hiring fixed
costs into account (Gans and Zhou 2002). We allow for hiring times as well as costs, but focus on
hiring a single employee, in line with the realities of small growing firms.

3.

A Dynamic Model of Entrepreneurial Growth

Here we introduce a dynamic model of entrepreneurial growth relying on two key complementary
resources, time and money.
3.1.

Model

Consider a risk-neutral entrepreneur who seeks to maximize her firm’s expected cash position after
N periods (e.g., a few years). In each period t (e.g., a month), she must decide how much of
her time (Tt ) and how much money (Mt ) to invest in the firm given her time available (Jt ), the
firm’s current cash position (It ), and the state of the economy (Zt ), assumed for simplicity to be
unidimensional.
In any period, the operating profit R(Mt , Tt , Zt ) depends on the money (Mt ) and time (Tt )
invested and the state of the economy (Zt ). We assume that R(Mt , Tt , Zt ) is (weakly) increasing,
is concave in Mt and in Tt , and has increasing differences in (Mt , Tt ). That is, more resources
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invested in the firm lead to greater profit, with diminishing returns. Similarly, a higher state of the
economy leads to greater profits. Time and money are complementary, so the marginal return on
investment in one is increasing in the investment in the other. We also assume that both resources
are necessary for growth; specifically, R(M, 0, Z) = R(0, 0, Z) and R(0, T, Z) = R(0, 0, Z) for all
M, T, Z. Finally, we assume that limM →∞ ∂R(M, T, Z)/∂M = limT →∞ ∂R(M, T, Z)/∂T = 0, i.e.,
the marginal returns on investments of one resource become negligible beyond some point if the
other resource remains finite. These assumptions are consistent with earlier work; e.g., Lévesque
and MacCrimmon (1997) use R(M, T, Z) = M α T 1−α for some α, 0 < α < 1, while manufacturing
models often consider R(M, T, Z) = min{M, T, Z } as discussed in Example 1 below; more generally,
economic models often set R(M, T, Z) = (aM ρ + (1 − a)T ρ )q/ρ (Dupuy and de Grip 2006).
Time is available only within a given budget Jt (e.g., 30 days per month), so Tt ≤ Jt . By contrast,
money can be borrowed or saved. Hence, time and money are fundamentally different resources:
time can be used to generate additional money (through R(Mt , Tt , Zt )), whereas money cannot be
used to generate additional time, unless the entrepreneur hires an employee.
If saved, money generates an interest r. Money can be borrowed at a cost B(Mt , It , Zt ), which
we assume nonnegative, increasing in Mt and decreasing in It and Zt . The more cash is available to
the firm, the lower the borrowing cost. We assume that B(Mt , It , Zt ) has decreasing differences in
(Mt , It ), is jointly convex in (Mt , It ), and is such that B(It , It , Zt ) = 0. For instance, B(Mt , It , Zt ) =
b(Zt ) max{0, Mt − It }, in which b(Zt ) is a borrowing rate dependent on the state of the economy.1
The entrepreneur’s cash position at the end of period t, It+1 , is then equal to
It+1 = It (1 + r) + Π(Mt , Tt |It , Zt ),
in which Π(Mt , Tt |It , Zt ) is the incremental profit obtained from operations relative to the future
value of the current cash position, had it been invested at a rate r:
Π(M, T |I, Z) ≡ R(M, T, Z) − (1 + r)M − B(M, I, Z) + r[M − I]+ .
We assume that the state of the economy in period t + 1 is a stochastic function of the state of
the economy in period t:
Zt+1 = φt (Zt , ωt ),
1

A state-dependent borrowing limit as in Buzacott and Zhang (2004), e.g., Mt ≤ κ(It , Zt ), can easily be incorporated
in the borrowing cost by setting B(Mt , It , Zt ) = ∞ for all Mt > κ(It , Zt ), as well as a cost of time C(T ) provided that
R(M, T, Z) is jointly concave in (M, T ). We ignore these features here to emphasize the greater fungibility of money
relative to time. Moreover, Berger and Udell (1998) note that “it does not make it quite so difficult for young firms
to obtain external finance, particularly debt from financial institutions, as is implied by the received wisdom about
the financial growth cycle” (pp. 624-625).
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in which ωt is a random variable with countable feasible set Ωt , i.e., ωt ∈ Ωt , as is commonly
assumed (Babich and Sobel 2004, Sobel and Turcic 2007). When |Ωt | = 1 for all t, the state of the
economy evolves deterministically.
We assume that the firm goes bankrupt if its cash position falls below a certain threshold L.
Archibald et al. (2002) and Li et al. (2009) consider L equal to zero. In case of bankruptcy, the
firm must pay bankruptcy costs K ≥ 0, as in Swinney et al. (2011), Xu and Birge (2006), Li et al.
(2009), and Kouvelis and Zhao (2011). We assume that bankruptcy costs are independent of the
firm’s cash level, but this can easily be relaxed using a model similar to Li et al. (2009). If L = −∞,
the firm never goes bankrupt, whereas if K = 0, bankruptcy is costless. The firm is not allowed to
borrow when it goes bankrupt, i.e., B(Mt , It , Zt ) = ∞ for all It < L and all Mt > 0.
The goal of the entrepreneur is to maximize the firm’s expected cash position in period N ,
PN −1
i.e., E[IN ] = (1 + r)N I0 + k=0 (1 + r)N −1−k Eωk [Π(Mk , Tk |Ik , Zk (ωk ))] , by appropriately choosing
the money and time investments (Mt , Tt ) in each period t given the firm’s cash position (It ) and
the state of the economy (Zt ). We formulate the problem as a finite-horizon dynamic program.
Denoting δ ≡ 1/(1 + r), let Vt0 (It , Jt , Zt ) be the entrepreneur’s expected cash position in period N ,
given the firm’s cash position (It ), available time (Jt ), and state of the economy (Zt ) in period t:
 0

Vt0 (It , Jt , Zt ) = maxMt ,Tt ≤Jt δEωt Vt+1
((1 + r)It + Π(Mt , Tt |It , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt )
if It ≥ L, t = 0, . . . , N − 1
(1)
VN0 (IN , JN , ZN ) = IN
if IN ≥ L
Vt0 (It , Jt , Zt ) = −K
if It < L, t = 0, . . . , N.
To avoid trivial cases, we assume that bankruptcy is never desirable, i.e., Vt0 (It , Jt , Zt ) > −K for
all It ≥ L.
To illustrate the parallel between an entrepreneur’s time and manufacturing capacity, we show
how our model relates to that in Babich and Sobel (2004).
Example 1 (Babich and Sobel 2004). Consider a manufacturing firm with capacity Jt and
cash position It in period t. The firm must decide how much capacity to allocate for production
(Tt ) and how much to invest in inventory of raw materials Mt to satisfy a demand Zt . If each unit
of product costs c in raw materials and can be sold at a price p, the firm’s revenue in any given
period is equal to R(Mt , Tt , Zt ) = p min{Mt /c, Tt , Zt }. Although the amount of capacity dedicated
to production is limited by the firm’s installed capacity, i.e., Tt ≤ Jt , the firm may borrow additional
cash at rate b(I, J, Z, η) assumed to be decreasing in the firm’s cash level (It ), capacity (Jt ),
demand (Zt ), and time-dependent risk-free discount factor (ηt ). Accordingly, the next-period cash
position equals It+1 = R(Mt , Tt , Zt ) − Mt − b(It , Jt , Zt , ηt )[Mt − It ]+ . Demand evolves randomly as
Zt+1 = a(Zt ) + ωt , with a0 (.) ≥ 0, which is general enough to model mean-reverting processes such
as AR(1). The evolution of ηt follows a similar process. If the firm’s cash position becomes negative,
it cannot repay its loans and goes bankrupt at no cost, i.e., L = 0 and K = 0. 
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Our growth model is thus highly consistent with the manufacturing-based model in Babich and
Sobel (2004), notwithstanding modest differences such as a 2-dimensional state-of-the-economy
variable, which could be incorporated easily. Our work generalizes the manufacturing-based models
by adopting a generic functional form for R(M, T, Z): manufacturing-based models typically treat
capacity and inventories as perfect complements, making the returns on capacity investments
(piecewise) constant, while we do not restrict the return on time to be constant.
3.2.

Optimal Time and Money Investment Policy

We next characterize the time and money investments that maximize the firm’s expected cash
position in period N . As in Li et al. (2009) and Sobel and Turcic (2007), we find that the value
function is increasing in the cash position increment (It+1 − It ), so it is optimal to myopically
maximize the current cash position.
Lemma 1 (Optimal Myopic Time and Money Investments). The

money

and

time

investments that maximize the current period profit Π(M, T |It , Zt ) also maximize expected final
 0

cash position δEωt Vt+1
((1 + r)It + Π(M, T |It , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ) .
In general, the amount of cash invested in growth will depend on the amount of cash available.
For instance, suppose that B(M, I, Z) = b(Z)[M − I]+ , with b(Z) > r. If the firm has limited cash
available, it needs to borrow at a cost b(Z) and will therefore invest a limited amount. If the firm
has more cash available, it will not need to borrow, though it may still reinvest all its available cash
in the business, referred to as bootstrapping (Ebben and Johnson 2006, Burgstone and Murphy
2012). Beyond a certain point, the firm will have so much cash that it will not need to reinvest it
all and will therefore earn savings at a rate r. The money invested in the business may therefore
depend on whether the firm borrows, bootstraps, or saves money.
Let
Π∗ (It , Jt , Zt ) ≡ max Π(Mt , Tt |It , Zt )
Mt ,Tt ≤Jt

denote the current period optimal profit. Lemma A-2 in the appendix shows that Π∗ (It , Jt , Zt ) is
increasing, concave in It and Jt , and has increasing differences in (It , Jt ). In other words, as the
firm grows, it will operate at higher levels of revenue, necessitating higher monetary investments.
Using Lemma 1, the value function (1) can be therefore be expressed in closed form:
 0

Vt0 (It , Jt , Zt ) = δEωt Vt+1
((1 + r)It + Π∗ (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ) if It ≥ L, t = 0, . . . , N − 1
(2)
VN0 (IN , JN , ZN ) = IN
if IN ≥ L
Vt0 (It , Jt , Zt ) = −K
if It < L, t = 0, . . . , N.
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3.3.

Bottleneck Shift

We next show that both time and money do constrain the firm’s growth, but at different stages of
the growth cycle, thereby reconciling the different opinions reviewed in §2.1 on what is the main
bottleneck for small firms. We do this by characterizing the current-period shadow prices of money
and time, µt and τt , defined as the current-period expected marginal benefit of an increase in It
and Jt respectively. Because an extra dollar in period t gets carried over to t + 1, unlike an extra
hour, we subtract the extra dollar in period t + 1 to focus only on the current-period benefits of an
increase in time or money. Assuming differentiability, these marginal values can be expressed as:
µt =

n
o
∂
∂ 0
0
Vt (It , Jt , Zt ) − δ
Eωt Vt+1
(It+1 , Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))
∂It
∂It+1

and

τt =

∂ 0
V (It , Jt , Zt ). (3)
∂Jt t

Our first key result characterizes the dynamics of these shadow prices µt and τt .
ˆ t , Jt ) and
Proposition 1 (Bottleneck Shift). In any period t, there exist thresholds I(Z
ˆ t , It ) such that τt < µt if and only if It < I(Z
ˆ t , Jt ) and τt < µt if and only if Jt > J(Z
ˆ t , It ).
J(Z
Proposition 1 establishes that the bottleneck shifts from money to time as available cash (It )
increases or available time (Jt ) decreases. As the firm grows, cash becomes less of a constraint since
the profit generated in previous periods can be accumulated and used to fuel growth in subsequent
periods. By contrast, the entrepreneur’s available time remains constrained, irrespective of past
profits. Moreover, because time and money are complementary, the marginal value of time increases
with the amount of cash available, making time even more valuable as the firm grows. This result is
consistent with the notion that early financial investments matter in achieving high growth (Evans
and Jovanovic 1989) and that time later becomes the bottleneck (Gifford 1992).
Figure 1 displays the shadow prices of money (µ0 ) and time (τ0 ) in period t = 0 as a function of
the initial cash position I0 . Money is the bottleneck (µ0 > τ0 ) when I0 is low and time is (τ0 > µ0 )
when I0 is high, and the unique bottleneck shift from money to time occurs when the cash position
ˆ 0 , J0 ) = 26.4. Although µ0 is monotonically decreasing, τ0 is not necessarily
crosses the threshold I(Z
monotone in cash position I0 . Furthermore, the shadow prices can be decomposed into a product
of two terms (see proof of Proposition 1): (i) the value of additional current-period cash or time
on next period’s cash I1 and (ii) the value of additional next-period cash I1 on the discounted cash
in period N , δ N IN , which is common to both shadow prices. Whereas the immediate effect of an
increase in time or cash is monotone, respectively increasing and decreasing in I0 , the latter effect
may not be monotone due to bankruptcy risk.2 Such effect of bankruptcy may also contribute
2

For instance when cash is so low that the firm inevitably goes bankrupt, marginally increasing the available cash
may not help at all. After a certain point, marginally increasing the cash helps the firm reduce the bankruptcy risk;
at that point, the returns to cash are increasing. Further increasing the cash available further reduces the chances of
bankruptcy, but with decreasing marginal returns.
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Shadow prices when t = 0 as a function of the initial cash position I0 .
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to the non-monotone behavior of τ0 in the region of low cash as observed in Figure 1. Despite
this non-monotone behavior of the shadow prices, Proposition 1 guarantees that there is only one
bottleneck shift as I0 increases, and that this shift is from money to time.
Figure 2 illustrates a sample path of the shadow prices of money and time. Due to the growth
uncertainty, one may observe multiple bottleneck shifts over time. Initially, the key bottleneck is
money (µt > τt ). Although both shadow prices start falling, µt falls faster than τt , eventually making
time the bottleneck. But at the end of period 2, a shock in the economy (Zt ) drains the available
cash and temporarily resurrects money as the bottleneck, which is then alleviated as the firm’s
cash position grows. Similar shifts could happen due to learning effects and process improvement
when the available time (Jt ) is non-stationary, which would provide the entrepreneur with more
time as the firm grows. If available time were constant (Jt = J) and the state of the economy such
that growth was ensured in every period, the bottleneck would shift only once.

4.

Hiring to Trade Off Money for Time

When the bottleneck shifts from money to time as the firm grows, it may be attractive to buy
more time by hiring an employee. In this section, we first present the model and then characterize
the optimal timing of hiring the first employee in terms of a one-step look-ahead policy (OSLA)
and then do the same for firing.
4.1.

Model

In this section, we enhance the growth model presented in (1) by allowing the entrepreneur to hire
an employee, who brings y additional units of time and costs a wage w. To allow for a difference
in productivity between the entrepreneur and the new hire, we convert the employee’s time to the
time it would take the entrepreneur to do the same tasks, so after hiring, the total available time
increases to Jt + y. The available money decreases to It − w.
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Figure 2

Sample path of shadow prices over time.
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Especially for entrepreneurs, hiring can be costly and time-consuming (Tansky and Heneman
2006). It costs money to advertise the position or use a recruiting agency, and then to provide
equipment and training for the new employee. The entrepreneur must also spend time to screen
applications (e.g., search on LinkedIn), assess the candidates’ fit and values, and train them. We
assume the entrepreneur incurs a fixed hiring cost HM ≥ 0 and hiring time HT ≥ 0 in the period
she hires the employee. The available cash in the hiring period, say t, is It − w − HM and the
available time is Jt + y − HT . Firing an employee may also cost money and time, denoted FM and
FT . Assuming that firing takes place immediately, the available cash in the firing period, say t, is
It − FM and the available time is Jt − FT . Effectively, these hiring/firing costs/times act as hiring
frictions, consistent with the irreversible nature of capacity investments (Dixit and Pindyck 1994).
In reality, hiring presents additional challenges, related to fit with the firm’s culture or uncertainty
about the employee’s capabilities (Hess 2012). We do not consider such factors explicitly, as they
are tangential to the time-money trade-off explored here, and for lower-level positions (e.g., office
manager), which tend to be hired first (Hess 2012, p. 72), they tend to be less relevant. The greater
these challenges, the greater our HM and HT will be.
Let Et ∈ {0, 1}, where Et = 1 when an employee has been hired prior to t and Et = 0 otherwise.
Let Vt (Et , It , Zt ) denote the firm’s expected cash value in period N when the number of employees
at the beginning of period t is Et , the available cash is It , and the state of the economy is Zt .
Incorporating hiring and firing in the growth model (1) leads to:
h
Vt (0, It , Zt ) = max
max
δEωt Vt+1 (Et , (1 + r)(It − (w + HM )Et )
Et ∈{0,1} Mt ,Tt ≤Jt +(y−HT )Et
i
+Π(Mt , Tt |It − (w + HM )Et , Zt ), φt (Zt , ωt ))
if It ≥ L, t = 0, . . . , N − 1
h
Vt (1, It , Zt ) = max
max
δEωt Vt+1 (Et , (1 + r)(It − wEt − FM (1 − Et )) (4)
Et ∈{0,1} Mt ,Tt ≤Jt +yEt −FT (1−Et )
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i
+Π(Mt , Tt |It − wEt − FM (1 − Et ), Zt ), φt (Zt , ωt )) if It ≥ L, t = 0, . . . , N − 1
VN (EN , IN , ZN ) = IN
Vt (Et , It , Zt ) = −K

if IN ≥ L,
if It < L.

Similar to Lemma 1, the optimal time and money investment policy turns out to be myopic.
To reflect the different hiring and firing frictions, we denote with f (It , Jt , Zt ), gH (It , Jt , Zt ),
gF (It , Jt , Zt ), and h(It , Jt , Zt ) the transition functions of the available cash (It ) when no employee
has been hired (Et = 0), when an employee has just been hired (Et−1 = 0, Et = 1), just been fired
(Et−1 = 1, Et = 0), or hired in a previous period (Et−1 = 1), respectively defined as follows:
f (It , Jt , Zt ) ≡ (1 + r)It + Π∗ (It , Jt , Zt ),
gH (It , Jt , Zt ) ≡ (1 + r)(It − w − HM ) + Π∗ (It − w − HM , Jt + y − HT , Zt ),
gF (It , Jt , Zt ) ≡ (1 + r)(It − FM ) + Π∗ (It − FM , Jt − FT , Zt ), and
h(It , Jt , Zt ) ≡ (1 + r)(It − w) + Π∗ (It − w, Jt + y, Zt ).
Using these notations, the dynamic programming formulation (4) simplifies to:
Vt (0, It , Zt ) = δ max {Eωt [Vt+1 (0, f (It , Jt , Zt ), φt (Zt , ωt ))] ,
Eωt [Vt+1 (1, gH (It , Jt , Zt ), φt (Zt , ωt ))]}
Vt (1, It , Zt ) = δ max{Eωt [Vt+1 (1, h(It , Jt , Zt ), φt (Zt , ωt ))] ,
Eωt [Vt+1 (0, gF (It , Jt , Zt ), φt (Zt , ωt ))]}
VN (EN , IN , ZN ) = IN
Vt (Et , It , Zt ) = −K

if It ≥ L, t = 0, . . . , N − 1
if It ≥ L, t = 0, . . . , N − 1
if IN ≥ L,
if It < L.

(5)

In the next two sections, we characterize the optimal timing of hiring and firing of an employee.
Our analytical treatment of hiring and firing is separate, but our numerical experiments in §5
consider both simultaneously.
4.2.

Optimal Timing of Hiring

We first characterize the optimal timing of hiring. We focus primarily on a one-step look-ahead
(OSLA) policy. We first characterize its structure, then study its sensitivity to the problem parameters, and finally show that it is optimal in case of deterministic growth. We show numerically in
§5 that the OSLA policy performs very well even in case of non-monotone, stochastic growth. The

practical implication of this result is that entrepreneurs do not need complete foresight, but could
instead base their hiring decisions on their forecasts of the immediate future.
4.2.1.

One-Step Look-Ahead Policy. If the current period is t, the OSLA policy aims at

maximizing the cash position at the end of the following period, i.e., It+2 , ignoring everything that
may occur from period t + 2 onwards. Accordingly, the OSLA policy recommends to hire in period
t if and only if that generates more cash by the end of period t + 1 than hiring in period t + 1. In
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principle, the entrepreneur could also decide not to hire before t + 2. The OSLA policy excludes
that option as it would lead to conservative hiring given that the benefits are reaped after the
OSLA horizon. (All our analytical results do hold if the OSLA policy allows for that option.)
We first need an assumption on the hiring costs and times: the higher the cash position at the
beginning of a period, the more attractive it becomes to hire to maximize the next-period starting
cash position It+1 . For example, this always holds when the hiring time is no greater than the
resulting time gain, i.e., when HT ≤ y, as shown in Lemma A-4 in the appendix.
Assumption 1. (HM , HT ) are such that gH (I, J, Z) − f (I, J, Z) is increasing in I.
This assumption allows one to characterize the timing of hiring in terms of the firm’s cash
position. The next lemma shows that the OSLA hiring policy in each period t can be characterized
in terms of a single cash threshold.
Lemma 2 (OSLA Hiring Policy). Define
OSLA
= min{I | Eωt [h(gH (I, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))] ≥ Eωt [gH (f (I, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))],
IH,t
and gH (I, Jt , Zt ) ≥ L}.
OSLA
The OSLA policy recommends to hire in period t if and only if It > IH,t
.
OSLA
An increase in IH,t
corresponds to a delay in the timing of hiring as the firm must accumulate

a higher cash level. Hiring is attractive only when the firm’s cash position is large enough. As one
CEO of a small firm put it, “we did not hire unless we had cash flow in house to pay their salary
and benefits for three to four months” (Hess 2012, p. 82).
4.2.2.

Sensitivity of OSLA Hiring Policy. In this section, we characterize the sensitivity of

the OSLA hiring cash threshold to available time (Jt ), state of the economy (Zt ), and hiring times
and costs (HT and HM ). Due to the complementarity of time and money and their substitutability
through hiring, the sensitivity analysis is in general intricate. We first consider the effect of time
available on the timing of hiring. The effect of Jt on the timing of hiring is in general ambiguous.
On the one hand, more time available today increases the return on monetary investments in the
current period, which favors not incurring the hiring cost and wage in the current period. On the
other hand, more time available today creates more cash in the next period, which increases the
return on time investments in the next period, and therefore favors not incurring the hiring time
then. When hiring is frictionless (i.e., HT = HM = 0), only the first effect is present, provided that
bankruptcy is not a threat (e.g., L = −∞), pushing towards delaying hiring. On the other hand,
the effect of Jt+1 on the timing of hiring is unequivocal: if the entrepreneur has more time available
in period t + 1, she is less inclined to hire in period t.
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Proposition 2 (Sensitivity to Time Available). Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then
OSLA
OSLA
IH,t
is increasing in Jt+1 . If HT = HM = 0 and L = −∞, IH,t
is also increasing in Jt .

We next characterize the sensitivity of the hiring timing with respect to the state of the economy,
which is again non-monotone. If the entrepreneur hires in period t, she will have more time but
possibly less cash available in period t + 1 than if she hired in period t + 1. Depending on whether
the state of the economy has a greater effect on the returns on cash or time, a higher state may thus
expedite or delay hiring. In order to obtain a finer characterization, we assume that the current
state of the economy does not affect the current period’s time and money investment decisions.
Similar additive representations of uncertainty have been adopted by Li (1988), Radner and Shepp
(1996), and Caldentey and Haugh (2006). Berger and Udell (1998) note that loan interest rates
for small firms are “sticky,” i.e., are typically not adjusted when the interest rates change; for
instance, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) use B(M, I, Z) = b[M − I] and Kouvelis and Zhao (2011)
use B(M, I, Z) = b(M )[M − I]+ , both independent of Z. Effectively, this assumption formalizes the
notion that only money (Mt ) and time (Tt ) can be the bottlenecks of the firm in the short term.
Assumption 2. R(M, T, Z) − B(M, I, Z) is separable in (M, T, I) and Z.
Under this assumption, we find that the higher the current state of the economy, the more likely
one should hire in the current period: with a higher state, more cash is generated today, so the
marginal returns on time in period t + 1 will be higher, favoring hiring in the current period.3
Proposition 3 (Sensitivity to State of the Economy). Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2
OSLA
hold. Then IH,t
is decreasing in Zt and is independent of Zt+1 .

The sensitivity of the timing of hiring with respect to the hiring cost and time again displays nonmonotone effects. The second part of the next proposition characterizes a special case in which such
a non-monotone effect arises. This case requires two conditions, which are satisfied, in particular,
when R(M, T, Z) = M α T β + Z for some α, β > 0, α + β < 1 and when B(M, I, Z) = b[M − I]+ .
Proposition 4 (Sensitivity to Hiring Time and Hiring Cost). Suppose Assumption 1
holds. Then:
OSLA
(i) IH,t
is increasing in HM ;

(ii) If Assumption 2 holds and

∂ 2 Π∗ (I,J,Z) ∂Π∗ (I,J,Z)
/ ∂J
∂J 2

OSLA
is increasing in I, then IH,t
is unimodal,

decreasing-increasing in HT .
3

OSLA
The result regarding the monotone impact of Zt on IH,t
can be strengthened if, instead of Assumption 2,
R(M, T, Z) − B(M, I, Z) were assumed to be supermodular in (M, T, I, −Z) and HT ≥ y. In that case, one would be
more willing to incur the resource drain associated with the hiring cost and hiring time when the state of the economy
is high, further expediting hiring in period t.
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Figure 3

Sensitivity of OSLA hiring cash threshold to hiring time.
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probability 0.375, 0.375, 0.25. Moreover, B(M, I, Z) = (0.2/12)[M − I]+ if M < 2I, and ∞ otherwise; r = 0.025/12,J =
30, I0 = 20.

An increase in either the hiring cost (HM ) or time (HT ) lowers the revenue in the hiring period
and therefore slows down future growth. If HM increases, delaying hiring is optimal as it postpones
the resource drain to a period where money is less valuable, as shown in Proposition 4(i). By
contrast, the effect of an increase in HT need not be monotone, as shown in Proposition 4(ii). Two
opposing effects are at play. An increase in HT favors delaying hiring in order to postpone incurring
the increased (time) cost of hiring. Conversely, the opportunity cost of time increases over time, so
the entrepreneur would prefer to hire earlier in order to incur the increased hiring time HT earlier
OSLA
when time is cheaper. This effect is illustrated in Figure 3. The OSLA hiring cash threshold IH,t

can be increasing in HT (when Z = 0), decreasing in HT (when Z = 30), or decreasing-increasing
in HT (when Z = 10 and Z = 20).
This difference in the effect of hiring cost and time highlights the importance of differentiating
between money and time in early-stage growth-oriented entrepreneurial firms. In classical staffing
models, fixed setup times are often implicitly converted to fixed setup costs. For example, Gans
and Zhou (2002, p. 994) suggest that the fixed hiring cost “typically includes advertising for,
interviewing, and testing of job applicants when appropriate. It may also include one-time training
costs that are independent of wages.” This is appropriate in larger firms, as studied by Gans and
Zhou (2002) and others, but not in our context: if the hiring time were treated as hiring cost, then
one would always delay hiring in response to an increase in hiring time, potentially conflicting with
our prescription.
4.2.3.

Optimality of OSLA Hiring Policy. We next show that the OSLA hiring policy,

despite its simplicity, is optimal when the firm grows deterministically, as in staffing planning

Author: The Time-Money Trade-Off for Entrepreneurs
Article submitted to ; manuscript no. (Please, provide the mansucript number!)

17

models (going back to Holt et al. 1960). In §5, we show numerically that it performs very well even
when growth is not guaranteed.
The first half of Proposition 5 below shows that in a deterministic setting it is never optimal
OSLA
to hire if the firm’s cash position falls below IH,t
, establishing necessity of the OSLA hiring

threshold condition. The second half shows sufficiency when three assumptions hold: increasing
state of economy, which is common in the entrepreneurship literature (Babich and Sobel 2004) and
the capacity expansion literature (e.g., Luss 1982, Angelus and Porteus 2002); profitability (i.e.,
f (I, J, Zt ) ≥ I); and constant available time (Jt+k = Jt for all k).
Proposition 5 (Optimality of OSLA Hiring Policy). Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2
hold true and that |Ωt+k | = 1 for all k ≥ 0.
OSLA
If it is optimal to hire in period t, then It > IH,t
.

Suppose also that (i) Zt+k ≤ Zt+k+1 for all k ≥ 0, (ii) f (I, J, Zt ) ≥ I, and (iii) Jt+k = Jt+k+1 for
OSLA
all k ≥ 0. Then it is optimal to hire in period t if and only if It > IH,t
.

The rationale behind this result is as follows: By Propositions 2 and 3, under growing states
of the economy (Zt ) and with constant time available for the entrepreneur (Jt ), the OSLA hiring
thresholds are decreasing over time. On the other hand under the specified growth conditions, the
firm’s cash position is increasing over time. As a result, the firm’s cash position will cross the hiring
threshold only once; accordingly, if the OSLA policy prescribes to hire in period t, it will also do
so in all subsequent periods. Effectively, the hiring set is absorbing (Bertsekas 2000).
4.3.

Optimal Timing of Firing

We next consider the timing of firing, ignoring the possibility of re-hiring the employee later.
Despite treating hiring and firing separately, we show in §5 that our OSLA hiring and firing policy
performs well in general. By and large, the results mirror those obtained before, thus deepening
the connection between hiring/firing and capacity expansion/contraction. We first characterize the
OSLA firing policy, then study its sensitivity to the model parameters, and finally establish that
it is optimal under certain conditions.
Under the OSLA firing policy, the employee is fired in period t if this increases It+2 more than
firing him in period t + 1. We assume, in the same spirit as Assumption 1, that firing does not
take any time (FT = 0) and that the firing cost is not too large (for instance, FM ≤ w, as shown in
Lemma A-9). These assumptions are sufficient, and not necessary, for the following results to hold.
Based on our interaction with entrepreneurs, firing often does not entail significant time investment
and the only cost is often a severance package, usually no more than one month of salary. Moreover
in §5, we numerically observe that, despite these limited frictions, firing typically only occurs when
the firm is on the verge of going bankrupt and offers only marginal relief.
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Assumption 3. FT = 0 and FM is such that gF (I, J, Z) − h(I, J, Z) is decreasing in I.
Under this assumption, the optimal policy can be characterized by two cash thresholds: the
entrepreneur should fire the employee if her cash position is sufficiently low that keeping him one
more period would not be economical, but not so low that the firing cost will cause bankruptcy.
Lemma 3 (OSLA Firing Policy). Suppose that Assumption 3 holds. Define
OSLA

I F,t

= min{I |gH (I, Jt , Zt ) ≥ L}.
= max{I | gF (I, Jt , Zt ) ≥ h(I, Jt , Zt ) − FM } and I OSLA
F,t
OSLA

The OSLA policy recommends to fire in period t if and only if I OSLA
≤ It ≤ I F,t
F,t

.

The next result mirrors Proposition 5 by demonstrating the optimality of the OSLA firing policy
when the future is deterministic, as often assumed in staffing models (Holt et al. 1960). As before, we
first establish necessity of the OSLA firing cash thresholds, and then, under additional assumptions,
show that they are also sufficient. Contrary to hiring, the optimality of the OSLA firing policy
is established in case of decline, and not growth. (For sensitivity results, see Proposition A-1 in
Appendix.)
Proposition 6 (Optimality of OSLA Firing Policy). Suppose that Assumption 3 holds
and that |Ωt+k | = 1 for all k ≥ 0.
OSLA

If it is optimal to fire in period t, then I OSLA
≤ It ≤ I F,t
F,t

.

Suppose also that (i) either Jt+k = Jt+k+1 for all k ≥ 0 or Jt+k ≤ Jt+k+1 for all k ≥ 0 and FM ≥ w,
(ii) Assumption 2 holds, and (iii) h(I, Jt+k , Zt+k ) ≤ I for all k ≥ 0. Then it is optimal to fire in
OSLA

≤ It ≤ I F,t
period t if and only if I OSLA
F,t
OSLA

OSLA
If IH,t
≥ I F,t

.

, the OSLA hiring-firing policy is similar to the classical “Invest-Stay Put-

Disinvest” policy of capacity expansion (Van Mieghem 2003), under which it is optimal to hire at
high cash levels, keep that employee (stay put) at intermediate levels, and fire that employee at
lower (but not too low) cash levels. (When the cash level is very low, i.e., below I OSLA
, it may
F,t
be optimal not to fire the employee if incurring the firing cost would precipitate the firm into
bankruptcy.) This result helps further draw the parallel between hiring and capacity expansion.

5.

Numerical Analysis

In this section, we show numerically that the OSLA policy is near-optimal and demonstrate its
robustness. We first describe the parameter values used in our experiments, then compare the
OSLA policy with the optimal policy, and finally discuss its robustness.
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Setup and Illustrative Examples

As a base case, we consider an entrepreneur who seeks to maximize the firm’s cash position after
N = 12 months, starting with I0 = $20, 000 and working J = 30 days per month. Money can be
borrowed at an annual rate b = 20% with a borrowing limit of κ = 100% of current cash level, similar
to Buzacott and Zhang (2004), so B(M, I, Z) = b[M − I]+ if M ≤ (1 + κ)I and B(M, I, Z) = ∞
otherwise. Excess money can be invested at an annual rate of r = 2.5%, and δ = 1/(1 + r). The
entrepreneur is bankrupt when her cash position falls below L = 0, which triggers bankruptcy costs
of K = $100, 000, which could roughly represent one year of lost salary while looking for a new job.
We consider a Cobb-Douglas revenue function, similar to Lévesque and MacCrimmon (1997),
and additive shocks, so R(M, T, Z) = kM α T β + Z with α < 1. Similar to Babich and Sobel (2004),
we assume that the state of the economy follows a martingale, i.e., Zt+1 = φ(Zt , ωt ) = Zt + ωt , in
which ωt is equal to $5, 000, −$5, 000, or $0 respectively with probability p, q, and 1 − p − q. In our
base case, we set Z0 = $0.4 The entrepreneur’s range of uncertainty about the economy increases
with her time horizon, but she may lose or gain up to 25% of her initial endowment (I0 ) even in
the first period. In our base case, we set p = 0.375 and q = 0.375. We also consider an optimistic
scenario, i.e., p = 0.5 and q = 0.25, and a pessimistic one, i.e., p = 0.25 and q = 0.5.
We assume that, if the entrepreneur were to invest all her initial endowment of time and money,
she would face, in expectation, a return of 5% in the first month, i.e., R(I0 , J, Z0 )/[(1 + r)I0 ] = 1.05,
which roughly translates into a 180% annual growth rate, not atypical for growing entrepreneurs.
We accordingly set k = 1.05(1 + r)(20)1−α J −β . In line with Proposition 1, we assume that money
is initially the bottleneck: the money the entrepreneur would like to invest in the business (the
solution to the first-order condition ∂R(M, J, Z)/∂M − (1 + r) = 0) is greater than her initial cash
1

endowment (I0 = $20, 000). Mathematically, we require that (αJ β k/(1 + r)) 1−α ≥ $20, 000, i.e.,
α ≥ 1/1.05 ≈ 0.95. In our base case, we assume α = 0.99 to ensure that cash will be the bottleneck
for at least a few periods. We consider three values for the elasticity of time: β = 0.7, β = 0.3, and
β = 3. Figure 4 depicts a few representative sample paths of the cash position under this base case,
when β = 0.7, assuming no hiring. The expected initial 5%-growth rate does not always materialize
and certainly does not guarantee the firm’s future growth.
Now assume the entrepreneur can hire an employee, costing w = $6, 000 per month and giving
the entrepreneur an extra y = 15 days of time per month to grow the business. Since recruiting
agencies typically collect one or two months of salary, we set HM = $12, 000. We assume hiring
takes considerable time, and set HT = 30 days (resulting in available time of 15 days during the
hiring period). By contrast, firing takes no time and costs one month’s severance, so FT = 0 and
4

With different starting points Z0 , we set φ(Zt , ωt ) = min{(N + 1)5, 000, max{−(N + 1)5, 000, Zt + ωt }} and set an
upper bound of $1, 000, 000 on It to limit the state space while solving the dynamic program.

Author: The Time-Money Trade-Off for Entrepreneurs
Article submitted to ; manuscript no. (Please, provide the mansucript number!)

20
Figure 4

Sample paths of cash and state of the economy with no hiring.
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FM = $6, 000. Note that, even though the derivation of the OSLA policy considers hiring and firing
separately, we consider them jointly here; in particular, the optimal policy to which we benchmark
the OSLA policy could potentially recommend several cycles of hiring and firing.
Is hiring valuable in our setting? Figure 5 plots the histogram of the discounted final cash (δ N IN )
without hiring and with the OSLA hiring policy for p = 0.375 and q = 0.375 averaged over 10,000
scenarios. The OSLA policy first-order stochastically dominates the no-hiring policy. Hiring via
the OSLA policy has limited influence on the bankruptcy probability (35.3% vs. 35.4% for no-
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Distribution of OSLA hiring times for different levels of economic drifts.
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hiring), but significantly improves the firms chance of higher growth. Without hiring the firm does
not exceed δ N IN = 350, but with OSLA-hiring there is a 28% probability of the firm reaching
δ N IN = 1000 or higher.
Figure 6 depicts a histogram of the OSLA hiring times in our base case (β = 0.7) under growing,
stable, and declining state of the economy, averaged over 10,000 scenarios. Conditional on hiring
taking place, the median hiring time is period 4 in all three cases, and the mean hiring time is
between 4.5 and 4.7. The probability of hiring is larger if the state of the economy (Zt ) has a
positive rather than negative drift, consistent with Proposition 3.
5.2.

Performance of OSLA Policy

Tables 1-3 display, for β = 0.7, β = 0.3, and β = 3, the expected cash position in period N (in
$1, 000’s), evaluated in period 0, using the optimal hiring policy (V0OP T ) and using the OSLA
hiring policy (V0OSLA ) for various starting cash positions and states of the economy. The optimality
gap is defined as ∆ = (V0OP T − V0OSLA )/|V0OP T |. Overall, the tables show that the OSLA policy
performs very well, typically within a few percent from the optimal policy. In particular, in all
reported instances, the optimality loss is never larger than $3,000. The OSLA policy performs well
because in our setting, (i) time and money investments are expected to generate growth and (ii)
cash accumulation accelerates growth due to the bootstrapping nature. In other settings (e.g., with
limited growth opportunities, negative profitability, or no ability to bootstrap), the OSLA policy
may not work well, but these settings would fundamentally differ from our growth context. Apart
from the obvious computational benefits, the good performance of the OSLA policy implies that
entrepreneurs facing growth opportunities may limit their horizon to one period and still do quite
well.
How sensitive is hiring to the prospect of being able to fire? In our growth setting, it turns out
that firing has very little impact on the performance of both the optimal and the OSLA policy.
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I0
20
20
20
10
10
10
30
30
30

Z0
0
-10
10
0
-10
10
0
-10
10

p = 0.5, q = 0.25
p = 0.375, q = 0.375
p = 0.25, q = 0.5
OSLA
OP T
OSLA
OP T
V0
∆ V0
V0
∆ V0
V0OSLA
∆
607
606 0.1%
346
345 0.2%
114
114 0.4%
-18
-19 2.9%
-75
-75 0.3%
-95
-95 0.1%
977
977 0.0%
974
974 0.0%
962
962 0.0%
472
472 0.2%
215
215 0.4%
26
25 2.2%
-100
-100 0.0%
-100
-100 0.0%
-100
-100 0.0%
945
945 0.0%
867
866 0.0%
715
715 0.0%
755
754 0.1%
546
545 0.1%
312
312 0.1%
55
54 1.7%
-48
-48 0.9%
-89
-89 0.1%
977
977 0.0%
977
977 0.0%
977
977 0.0%

V0OP T

Table 1

I0
20
20
20
10
10
10
30
30
30

p = 0.5, q = 0.25
p = 0.375, q = 0.375
p = 0.25, q = 0.5
Z0 V0OP T V0OSLA
∆ V0OP T V0OSLA
∆ V0OP T V0OSLA
∆
0
208
206 0.8%
70
68 2.6%
-31
-32 4.6%
-10
-53
-54 2.3%
-84
-84 0.6%
-96
-96 0.1%
10
687
687 0.0%
497
496 0.1%
295
293 0.6%
0
151
149 1.3%
31
29 5.5%
-50
-51 2.0%
-10
-100
-100 0.0%
-100
-100 0.0%
-100
-100 0.0%
10
589
589 0.0%
395
394 0.2%
206
204 1.0%
0
276
274 0.5%
117
115 1.5%
-4
-6 38.4%
-10
-21
-23 8.9%
-71
-72 1.1%
-93
-93 0.2%
10
787
787 0.0%
618
618 0.0%
419
419 0.0%
Table 2

I0
20
20
20
10
10
10
30
30
30

Performance of OSLA hiring policy when β = 0.7

Performance of OSLA hiring policy when β = 0.3

p = 0.5, q = 0.25
p = 0.375, q = 0.375
p = 0.25, q = 0.5
Z0 V0OP T V0OSLA
∆ V0OP T V0OSLA
∆ V0OP T V0OSLA
∆
0
805
803 0.2%
592
591 0.3%
345
344 0.2%
-10
104
104 0.5%
-29
-29 0.9%
-85
-85 0.1%
10
977
977 0.0%
977
977 0.0%
977
977 0.0%
0
694
692 0.3%
417
415 0.5%
152
151 0.7%
-10
-100
-100 0.0%
-100
-100 0.0%
-100
-100 0.0%
10
977
977 0.0%
977
977 0.0%
977
977 0.0%
0
977
977 0.0%
977
977 0.0%
977
977 0.0%
-10
237
236 0.4%
35
34 1.6%
-64
-64 0.2%
10
977
977 0.0%
977
977 0.0%
977
977 0.0%
Table 3

Performance of OSLA hiring policy when β = 3

Table 4 reports the discounted final cash δ N IN of the optimal policy and the OSLA policy both
when firing is frictionless (FM = FT = 0) and when firing is not allowed, in our base case of hiring
frictions (HM = $12, 000 and HT = 30 days) as well as when hiring is frictionless (HM = HT = 0),
when β = 0.7, p = q = 0.375. As shown in the table, not allowing firing only leads to a marginal
decline in performance. On the other hand, hiring frictions significantly affect performance.
Firing has little impact on performance here primarily because of our growth assumptions. In
that setting, hiring accelerates growth; as a result, it is unlikely that, if the firm has hired an
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I0
20
20
20
10
10
10
30
30
30

Z0
0
-10
10
0
-10
10
0
-10
10

Table 4

HM = $12, 000, HT = 30 days
Frictionless Firing
No Firing
V0OP T V0OSLA
∆ V0OP T V0OSLA
346
346 0.2%
346
345
-75
-75 0.3%
-75
-75
974
974 0.0%
974
974
216
215 0.4%
215
215
-100
-100 0.0%
-100
-100
867
866 0.0%
867
866
546
545 0.1%
546
545
-48
-48 0.9%
-48
-48
977
977 0.0%
977
977

∆
0.2%
0.3%
0.0%
0.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.1%
0.9%
0.0%
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HM = $0, HT = 0 days
Frictionless Firing
No Firing
V0OP T V0OSLA
∆ V0OP T V0OSLA
977
977 0.0%
977
977
118
118 0.0%
108
108
977
977 0.0%
977
977
475
475 0.0%
474
474
-100
-100 0.0%
-100
-100
977
977 0.0%
977
977
977
977 0.0%
977
977
977
977 0.0%
977
977
977
977 0.0%
977
977

∆
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Performance of OSLA hiring policy with and without hiring frictions when β = 0.7, p = q = 0.375

employee, it would need to fire her at some point. Moreover, the state of the economy must be low
if the firm needs to fire her employee. Given that successive states of the economy are positively
correlated here, this implies that future states of the economy may also be low, and therefore
that firing rarely helps avert going bankrupt. Given the low impact of firing on performance, we
therefore conclude that treating them separately, as we did in our derivation of the OSLA policy
in §4, can be done with no great loss of optimality when considering a growth-oriented firm, unlike
established firms (Bentolila and Bertola 1990).
The sensitivity of both the OSLA and the optimal policies with respect to bankruptcy costs
K is shown in Tables 5 and 6. Specifically, we consider K = $10, 000, 000 and K = $0 (the base
case takes K = $100, 000). We observe a marginal deterioration in the OSLA performance when
the bankruptcy cost is large and when the chance that the firm will not go bankrupt is moderate.
(Even when the relative optimality loss may appear large, as when I0 = $30, 000, Z0 = $0, p = 0.5,
and q = 0.25 in Table 5, the absolute loss remains small, especially compared to the $10,000,000bankruptcy cost.) If it is clear that the firm will go bankrupt, then OSLA performs as poorly as
the optimal policy; and if it is clear that the firm will not go bankrupt, then the bankruptcy cost
has minimal influence.
5.3.

Robustness

How robust are the OSLA thresholds to the model parameters? Table 7 displays the OSLA hiring
and firing thresholds for different values of the money and time elasticities α and β and different
values of Zt .5 Consistent with Proposition 3, the hiring thresholds are increasing in Zt . (The
firing upper thresholds are independent of Zt , consistent with Proposition A-1 in the Appendix.)
OSLA
Moreover, the dependence of the hiring cash threshold on Zt appears almost linear, so IH,t
should
5

Because the OSLA hiring policy does not consider firing and vice versa, the OSLA hiring cash threshold need not
be larger than the OSLA firing threshold, as when Zt is large. This does not mean that the entrepreneur should hire
to fire: Zt is so large that the cash position after hiring will likely be above the firing threshold.
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p = 0.5, q = 0.25
I0 Z0
V0OSLA
∆
20 0
-711
-727 2.3%
20 -10 -7,583 -7,585 0.0%
20 10
977
977 0.0%
10 0 -1,561 -1,571 0.6%
10 -10 -9,961 -9,961 0.0%
10 10
885
880 0.5%
30 0
-76
-113 49.7%
30 -10 -5,980 -5,987 0.1%
30 10
977
977 0.0%
V0OP T

Table 5

I0
20
20
20
10
10
10
30
30
30

p = 0.375, q = 0.375
V0OP T V0OSLA
∆
-3,204 -3,237 1.0%
-9,034 -9,037 0.0%
974
974 0.0%
-4300 -4,323 0.5%
-9,961 -9,961 0.0%
464
448 3.4%
-1,998 -2,049 2.6%
-8,258 -8,266 0.1%
977
977 0.0%

p = 0.25, q = 0.5
V0OSLA
∆
-6,302 -6,335 0.5%
-9,736 -9,737 0.0%
962
962 0.0%
-7,232 -7,259 0.4%
-9,961 -9,961 0.0%
-727
-749 3.1%
-4,754 -4,788 0.7%
-9,499 -9,504 0.0%
977
977 0.0%
V0OP T

Performance of OSLA hiring policy when β = 0.7 and K = $10, 000, 000

p = 0.5, q = 0.25
p = 0.375, q = 0.375
p = 0.25, q = 0.5
Z0 V0OP T V0OSLA
∆ V0OP T V0OSLA
∆ V0OP T V0OSLA
∆
0
621
620 0.1%
382
382 0.1%
179
179 0.1%
-10
58
58 0.9%
15
15 1.5%
2
2 2.2%
10
977
977 0.0%
974
974 0.0%
962
962 0.0%
0
493
492 0.1%
261
260 0.3%
99
99 0.3%
-10
0
0 0.0%
0
0 0.0%
0
0 0.0%
10
946
946 0.0%
871
871 0.0%
729
729 0.0%
0
764
763 0.0%
572
571 0.1%
364
364 0.0%
-10
116
115 0.8%
35
35 1.1%
6
6 1.4%
10
977
977 0.0%
977
977 0.0%
977
977 0.0%
Table 6

OSLA
IH,t

OSLA

I F,t

Performance of OSLA hiring policy when β = 0.7 and K = $0

α

β

0.99
0.99
0.99
0.8
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.8

0.7
0.3
3
0.7
0.7
0.3
3
0.7

Table 7

-60
94
108
86
90
12
23
6
12

-50
84
98
76
80
12
23
6
12

-40
74
88
66
70
12
23
6
12

-30
64
77
56
60
12
23
6
12

-20
53
66
46
50
12
23
6
12

Zt
-10 0
43 33
56 45
35 25
40 30
12 12
23 23
6 6
12 12

10
22
34
15
20
12
23
6
12

20
12
23
6
12
12
23
6
12

30
1
11
1
1
12
23
6
12

40
1
1
1
1
12
23
6
12

50
1
1
1
1
12
23
6
12

60
1
1
1
1
12
23
6
12

OSLA hiring and firing cash thresholds when p = q = 0.375

OSLA
not be too sensitive to the variance of Zt if its mean is properly estimated. Furthermore, IH,t

appears relatively robust to misspecifications of α and β, at least up to a limit: when the time
elasticity falls below a certain level (e.g., when β ≤ 0.5 if α = 0.8), the hiring threshold jumps to
infinity, so it becomes optimal to never hire.
The high performance of the OSLA policy raises the question: How important is the timing of
hiring? What are the consequences of hiring too early or too late? To address this question, we
conduct the following experiment. For all t, we evaluate the expected revenue δ N IN , averaged over
10,000 simulation runs, with an OSLA policy when the hiring cash thresholds are perturbed, i.e.,
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Figure 7

Relative losses in optimality when the hiring cash thresholds are perturbed.
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Note. (HM , HT ) = ($12, 000, 30 days) (left) and (HM , HT ) = ($6, 000, 15 days) (right).
OSLA
by using IH,t
+ π, for all t, π = −10, · · · , +10. Figure 7 depicts the relative loss of revenue from
OSLA
OSLA
using cash thresholds IH,t
+ π instead of IH,t
, when p = 0.5 and q = 0.25 (solid), p = 0.375 and

q = 0.375 (dashed), and p = 0.25 and q = 0.5 (dotted) for high hiring cost and time (left) and low
hiring cost and time (right).
Overall, the figure shows that the hiring cash thresholds are relatively robust when the cash
thresholds are overestimated. By contrast, underestimating the hiring cash thresholds can lead
to a significant loss of revenue. The risks involved in hiring are highly asymmetric: while hiring
OSLA
OSLA
too late (high IH,t
) hurts performance only moderately, hiring too early (low IH,t
) can have

severe consequences, potentially precipitating the entrepreneur into bankruptcy. The asymmetry
in the optimality loss curve is consistent with our result that in a deterministic environment the
OSLA hiring cash threshold is a lower bound on the optimal hiring threshold (Proposition 5(i)).
Overall, Figure 7 indicates that the optimal threshold is relatively insensitive to perturbations, so
reasonable approximations such as the OSLA cash threshold should perform well.

6.

Conclusions

In this paper, we study how growth in small entrepreneurial firms is affected by two key constraints:
money and time. The two resources are asymmetric in that (i) money, unlike time, is fungible, and
(ii) the primary output of the firm is money, not time. We introduce a model of growth, which
depends on complementary inputs of money and time, explore the consequences of this asymmetry,
and how entrepreneurs can trade time and money.
First, we establish that as the firm grows, there is a fundamental shift in the bottleneck from
money to time. Hiring is then a natural mechanism to trade off less valuable money for more
valuable time, thereby increasing capacity to accelerate growth.
Second, we characterize the timing of hiring in terms of a cash level threshold via a one-stagelook-ahead (OSLA) policy. We numerically demonstrate that this OSLA policy performs well and
show that it is optimal under deterministic growth. The high performance of the OSLA policy is
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driven by the growth conditions and bootstrapping strategy inherent in our context. This suggests
that the hiring of subsequent employees may also be timed in an OSLA fashion, similar to the
timing of the first employee, provided that these growth conditions continue to hold.
Unlike established firm settings of capacity expansion or staffing, for growth-oriented firms, the
entrepreneur’s time is critical for growth and thus cannot implicitly be converted into money. In
particular, we show that unlike hiring costs, which always delay the timing of hiring, greater hiring
times may delay or expedite the timing of hiring. This is due to two opposing effects: an increase
in hiring time yields slower growth pushing for hiring later, but the entrepreneur wants to incur
the higher hiring time when her time is less valuable, pushing for hiring earlier.
To sustain growth, entrepreneurs must effectively marshal their key resources, such as time and
money. Managing operations in these growth settings requires properly identifying the bottleneck
resource at specific points in time and putting in place strategies to alleviate them.
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Appendix
Lemma A-1. Vt0 (It , Jt , Zt ) is increasing in It .
Proof.

The proof is by induction on t. By (1), when t = N , VN0 (IN , JN , ZN ) = IN if IN > L and it is equal

to −K otherwise. Fix t and suppose that Vt0+1 (It+1 , Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) is increasing in It+1 . Let I + > I − . Suppose
that I − ≥ L. Then, using (1),


max δEωt Vt0+1 ((1 + r)I + + Π(Mt , Tt |I + , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt )
Mt ,Tt ≤Jt


≥ max δEωt Vt0+1 ((1 + r)I − + Π(Mt , Tt |I − , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ) = Vt0 (I − , Jt , Zt ),

Vt0 (I + , Jt , Zt ) =

Mt ,Tt ≤Jt

in which the inequality follows by induction hypothesis and because Π(Mt , Tt |I, Zt ) is increasing in I since
B(M, I, Z) is decreasing in I. If I − < L, then Vt0 (I − , Jt , Zt ) = −K ≤ Vt0 (I + , Jt , Zt ) by assumption on K,
with equality only if I + < L. 
Proof of Lemma 1.



By Lemma A-1, maximizing δEωt Vt0+1 ((1 + r)It + Π(Mt , Tt |It , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt )

with respect to (Mt , Tt ) is equivalent to maximizing Π(Mt , Tt |It , Zt ).



Lemma A-2. (i) Π∗ (I, J, Z) has increasing differences in (I, J); (ii) Π∗ (I, J, Z) is concave increasing in
(I, J).
Proof.

(i) The function Π(M, T |I, Z) is supermodular in (M, T, I) since the sum of supermodular func-

tions is supermodular (Lemma 2.6.1 in Topkis 1998) and since (i) R(M, T, Z) is supermodular in (M, T ), (ii)
B(M, I, Z) is submodular in (M, I), (iii) [M − I]+ is submodular in (M, −I) since it is a convex increasing

Author: The Time-Money Trade-Off for Entrepreneurs
Article submitted to ; manuscript no. (Please, provide the mansucript number!)

30

transformation of an isotone valuation in (M, I) by Lemma 2.6.4 in Topkis (1998). Because Π(M, T |I, Z) is
supermodular in (M, T, I), and because the feasible set of T is increasing in J respectively, the result follows
from Theorem 2.7.6 in Topkis (1998).
(ii) When maximized over T ≤ J, Π(M, T |I, Z) = Π(M, J|I, Z) since Π(M, T |I, Z) is increasing in J. The
function Π(M, J|I, Z) is concave in (M, J, I) since B(M, I, Z) is convex in (M, I) and R(M, J, Z) is concave
in (M, J). Because concavity is preserved under maximization over convex sets (Boyd and Vandenberghe
2004), Π∗ (I, J, Z) is concave in (I, J).
Proof of Proposition 1.



To simplify notations, we assume that Π∗ (I, J, Z) is differentiable in (I, J). Apply-

ing the chain rule to (1) and using Lemma 1, we obtain:
∂ 0
V (It , Jt , Zt )
∂J t

 ∂ ∗
∂
= δ Eωt Vt0+1 ((1 + r)It + Π∗ (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))
Π (It , Jt , Zt ), and
∂I
∂J


∂ 0
∂
µt =
Vt (It , Jt , Zt ) − δ Eωt Vt0+1 (It+1 , Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))
∂I
∂I
 0
 ∂ ∗
∂
= δ Eωt Vt+1 ((1 + r)It + Π∗ (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))
Π (It , Jt , Zt ).
∂I
∂I
τt =

Hence µt > τt if and only if ∂Π∗ (It , Jt , Zt )/∂It − ∂Π∗ (It , Jt , Zt )/∂Jt > 0. Because Π∗ (I, J, Z) is concave in
(I, J) and has increasing differences in (I, J) by Lemma A-2, the left-hand side is decreasing in It and increasing in Jt . When It < L, Mt = 0 for otherwise B(Mt , It , Zt ) = ∞ by assumption, and therefore Π∗ (It , Jt , Zt ) =
R(0, Jt , Zt ) = R(0, 0, Zt ). Hence, ∂Π∗ (It , Jt , Zt )/∂It = 0 for all It < L, and the left-hand side is nonnegative
by Lemma A-2(ii). On the other hand, when It → ∞, Π∗ (It , Jt , Zt ) = maxMt ,Tt ≤Jt R(Mt , Tt , Zt ) − (1 + r)Mt
since limI→∞ B(M, I, Z) ≤ B(M, M, Z) = 0. Hence, limIt →∞ ∂Π∗ (It , Jt , Zt )/∂It = 0, and the left-hand side is
ˆ
nonpositive by Lemma A-2(ii). Hence, there exists a cash threshold Iˆ such that τt < µt if and only if It < I.
When Jt = 0, ∂Π∗ (It , Jt , Zt )/∂It = 0 since Π∗ (It , 0, Zt ) = maxMt R(M, 0, Zt ) − (1 + r)M − B(M, I, Zt ) +
(1 + r)[M − I]+ ≤ R(0, 0, Zt ); in that case, the left-hand side is nonpositive by Lemma A-2(ii). On the other
hand, when Jt → ∞, ∂Π∗ (It , Jt , Zt )/∂Jt = 0, and the left-hand side is nonnegative by Lemma A-2(ii). Hence,
ˆ
there exists a time threshold Jˆ such that τt < µt if and only if Jt > J.

Lemma A-3. Vt (Et , It , Zt ) is increasing in It .
Proof.

The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma A-1. 

Lemma A-4. For any y ≥ HT , gH (I, J, Z) − f (I, J, Z) is increasing in I and decreasing in J.
Proof.

Define y ≡ y − HT ≥ 0 and w ≡ w + HM ≥ 0. Fix  > 0. By Lemma A-2, Π∗ (I, J, Z) is concave in

I and has increasing differences in (I, J). Accordingly,
Π∗ (I +  − w, J + y, Z) − Π∗ (I − w, J + y, Z) ≥ Π∗ (I + , J + y, Z) − Π∗ (I, J + y, Z)
≥ Π∗ (I + , J, Z) − Π∗ (I, J, Z).
Hence, Π∗ (I, J, Z) − Π∗ (I − w, J + y, Z) ≥ Π∗ (I + , J, Z) − Π∗ (I +  − w, J + y, Z), i.e., Π∗ (I, J, Z) − Π∗ (I −
w, J + y, Z) is decreasing in I. Using the fact that Π∗ (I, J, Z) is concave in I and has increasing differences
in (I, J) by Lemma A-2, the proof that Π∗ (I, J, Z) − Π∗ (I − w, J + y, Z) is increasing in J follows a similar
argument.
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≤

gH (I, Jt , Zt )

+

HM ,
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then

gH (f (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 )

≤

h(gH (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ).
Proof.

We have:
gH (f (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) − h(gH (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 )

(A-1)

= (1 + r)(f (It , Jt , Zt ) − w − HM ) − (1 + r)(gH (It , Jt , Zt ) − w)
+Π∗ (f (It , Jt , Zt ) − w − HM , Jt+1 + y − HT , Zt+1 ) − Π∗ (gH (It , Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y, Zt+1 )
≤ Π∗ (gH (It , Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y − HT , Zt+1 ) − Π∗ (gH (It , Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y, Zt+1 ) ≤ 0,

(A-2)

in which the first inequality follows because Π∗ (I, J, Z) is increasing in I by Lemma A-2 and since
f (It , Jt , Zt ) ≤ gH (It , Jt , Zt ) + HM , and the second inequality follows because Π∗ (I, J, Z) is increasing in J by
Lemma A-2.



Lemma A-6. Under Assumption 1, when f (It , Jt , Zt ) ≥ gH (It , Jt , Zt ) + HM , gH (f (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) −
h(gH (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) is decreasing in It .
Proof.

We use equation (A-1). By Assumption 1, f (I, J, z) − gH (I, J, Z) is decreasing in I. Fix  > 0. By

Lemma A-2, Π∗ (I, J, Z) has increasing differences in (I, J) and is concave increasing in I. Hence,
Π∗ (gH (It + , Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y, Zt+1 ) − Π∗ (gH (It , Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y, Zt+1 )
≥ Π∗ (gH (It + , Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y − HT , Zt+1 ) − Π∗ (gH (It , Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y − HT , Zt+1 )
≥ Π∗ (f (It + , Jt , Zt ) + gH (It , Jt , Zt ) − f (It , Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y − HT , Zt+1 )
−Π∗ (gH (It , Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y − HT , Zt+1 )
≥ Π∗ (f (It + , Jt , Zt ) − w − HM , Jt+1 + y − HT , Zt+1 ) − Π∗ (f (It , Jt , Zt ) − w − HM , Jt+1 + y − HT , Zt+1 ) ,
in which the first inequality follows because g(I, J, Z) is increasing in I and because Π∗ (I, J, Z) is increasing in
I and has increasing differences in (I, J); the second is because Π∗ (I, J, Z) is increasing in I and gH (It , Jt , Zt )−
f (It , Jt , Zt ) is increasing in It by Assumption 1; and the last inequality follows because Π∗ (I, J, Z) is concave in I and f (It , Jt , Zt ) ≥ gH (It , Jt , Zt ) + HM . Hence, Π∗ (f (It , Jt , Zt ) − w − HM , Jt+1 + y − HT , Zt+1 ) −
Π∗ (gH (It , Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y, Zt+1 ) is decreasing in It .
Proof of Lemma 2.

OSLA
H,t

Suppose that It > I



. Because Π∗ (I, J, Z) is increasing in I by Lemma A-

2, gH (It , Jt , Zt ) ≥ L. By Assumption 1, there exists a threshold I such that gH (I, Jt , Zt ) + HM >
f (I, Jt , Zt ) if and only I > I. We consider two cases. First, suppose that It ≥ I. Then, by Lemma A-5,
gH (f (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) ≤ h(gH (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) for all Zt+1 . Second, suppose that It ≤ I, and thereOSLA
fore, that IH,t
< I. Then, by Lemma A-6,

Eωt [gH (f (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt )) − h(gH (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))]
OSLA
OSLA
≤ Eωt [gH (f (IH,t
, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt )) − h(gH (IH,t
, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))] ≤ 0.
OSLA
Hence, hiring in period t maximizes It+2 . The proof for the case in which It < IH,t
is similar.
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Proof of Proposition 2.

OSLA
The proof applies the implicit function theorem to the equations defining IH,t
.

OSLA
OSLA
Suppose that gH (IH,t
, Jt , Zt ) = L. Then, IH,t
is independent of Jt+1 .

Suppose
OSLA
H,t

h(gH (I
f (I

OSLA
H,t

next

that

OSLA
G(IH,t
, Jt+1 )

OSLA
Eωt [gH (f (IH,t
, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))

≡

, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))] = 0. By Lemma A-5, we must have that gH (I
OSLA
H,t

, Jt , Zt ). Hence by Lemma A-6, G(I

OSLA
H,t

−

, Jt , Zt ) + HM ≤

, Jt+1 ) is decreasing in It . For each ωt ∈ Ωt , when

gH (I, Jt , Zt ) + HM ≤ f (I, Jt , Zt ), we have
∂gH (f (I, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt )) ∂h(gH (I, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))
−
∂J
∂J
∗
∂Π (f (I, Jt , Zt ) − HM − w, Jt+1 + y − HT , φt (Zt , ωt )) ∂Π∗ (gH (I, Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y, φt (Zt , ωt ))
=
−
∂J
∂J
∗
∂Π (gH (I, Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y − HT , φt (Zt , ωt )) ∂Π∗ (gH (I, Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y, φt (Zt , ωt ))
≥
−
∂J
∂J
∂Π∗ (gH (I, Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y, φt (Zt , ωt )) ∂Π∗ (gH (I, Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y, φt (Zt , ωt ))
≥
−
≥ 0,
∂J
∂J
in which the first inequality follows because Π∗ (I, J, Z) has increasing differences in (I, J) by Lemma A-2 and
because f (It , Jt , Zt ) ≥ gH (It , Jt , Zt ) + HM ; and the second inequality follows because Π∗ (I, J, Z) is concave
OSLA
in J by Lemma A-2. Hence, G(IH,t
, Jt+1 ) is increasing in Jt+1 .
OSLA
, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt )) −
Suppose now that HT = HM = 0 and L = −∞. Suppose that Eωt [gH (f (IH,t
OSLA
OSLA
OSLA
OSLA
, Jt , Zt ) = 0 since
, Jt , Zt ) − h(IH,t
, Jt ) ≡ f (IH,t
, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))] = 0, i.e., G(IH,t
h(gH (IH,t
OSLA
gH (.) = h(.). Since Π(I, J, Z) is concave in I and has increasing differences in (I, J), G(IH,t
, Jt ) is decreasing
OSLA
in I and increasing in Jt , i.e., IH,t
is increasing in Jt .

Proof of Proposition 3.



OSLA
The proof applies the implicit function theorem to the equations defining IH,t
.

OSLA
solves gH (I, Jt , Zt ) = L. Because the left-hand side is increasing in I by Lemma A-2 and
Suppose that IH,t

increasing in Z, we obtain that dItOSLA /dZt ≤ 0.
Suppose

next

that

OSLA
, Jt+1 )
G(IH,t

≡

OSLA
, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))
Eωt [gH (f (IH,t

−

OSLA
OSLA
h(gH (IH,t
, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))] = 0. By Lemma A-5, we must have that gH (IH,t
, Jt , Zt ) + HM ≤
OSLA
OSLA
f (IH,t
, Jt , Zt ). Hence by Lemma A-6, G(IH,t
, Jt+1 ) is decreasing in It . For each ωt ∈ Ωt , when

gH (I, Jt , Zt ) + HM ≤ f (I, Jt , Zt ), we have
∂gH (f (I, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt )) ∂f (I, Jt , Zt ) ∂h(gH (I, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt )) ∂gH (I, Jt , Zt )
−
∂Z
∂I
∂I
 ∂Z
∂φt (Zt , ωt ) ∂gH (f (I, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt )) ∂h(gH (I, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))
+
−
∂Z
∂Z
∂Z
 ∗

∂gH (I, Jt , Zt ) ∂Π (f (I, Jt , Zt ) − w − HM , Jt+1 + y − HT , φt (Zt , ωt )) ∂Π∗ (gH (I, Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y, φt (Zt , ωt ))
=
−
∂Z
∂I
∂I
 ∗

∗
∂gH (I, Jt , Zt ) ∂Π (f (I, Jt , Zt ) − w − HM , Jt+1 + y, φt (Zt , ωt )) ∂Π (gH (I, Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y, φt (Zt , ωt ))
≤
−
∂Z
∂I
∂I


∂gH (I, Jt , Zt ) ∂Π∗ (gH (I, Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y, φt (Zt , ωt )) ∂Π∗ (gH (I, Jt , Zt ) − w, Jt+1 + y, φt (Zt , ωt ))
≤
−
= 0,
∂Z
∂I
∂I
in which the first equality is because of Assumption 2; the first inequality follows because Π∗ (I, J, Z) has
increasing differences in (I, J) by Lemma A-2 and gH (I, Jt , Zt ) is increasing in Zt ; and the second inequality
follows because Π∗ (I, J, Z) is concave in I by Lemma A-2 and because f (It , Jt , Zt ) ≥ gH (It , Jt , Zt ) + HM .
OSLA
Therefore, G(IH,t
, Zt ) is decreasing in Zt .
OSLA
Summarizing, we obtain that IH,t
is decreasing in Zt . 
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OSLA
The proof applies the implicit function theorem to the equations defining IH,t
.

OSLA
Suppose that IH,t
solves gH (I, Jt , Zt ) = L. Because the left-hand side is increasing in I and decreasing in
OSLA
OSLA
HT and HM by Lemma A-2, we obtain that dIH,t
/dHM ≥ 0 and dIH,t
/dHT ≥ 0 in that case.

Next,

suppose

OSLA
H,t

h(gH (I
f (I

OSLA
H,t

that

OSLA
G(IH,t
, Jt+1 )

≡

OSLA
Eωt [gH (f (IH,t
, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))
OSLA
H,t

, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))] = 0. By Lemma A-5, we must have that gH (I

, Jt , Zt ). Hence by Lemma A-6, G(I

OSLA
H,t

−

, Jt , Zt ) + HM ≤

, Jt+1 ) is decreasing in It .

(i) For each ωt ∈ Ωt , when gH (I, Jt , Zt ) + HM ≤ f (I, Jt , Zt ), we have
∂gH (f (I, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt )) − h(gH (I, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))
∂HM
∂Π∗ (It − HM − w, J − HT + y, Zt ) ∂Π∗ (f (It , Zt ) − HM − w, J − HT + y, Zt+1 )
= r(1 + r) + (1 + r)
−
∂I
∂I 
∗
∗
∂Π (gH (It , Zt ) − w, J + y, Zt+1 )
∂Π (It − HM − w, J − HT + y, Zt )
+
1+r+
∂I
∂I
∂Π∗ (It − HM − w, J − HT + y, Zt )
≥ r(1 + r) + (1 + r)
∂I

∂Π∗ (It − HM − w, J − HT + y, Zt )
∂Π∗ (gH (It , Zt ) − w, J + y, Zt+1 )
r+
≥ 0.
+
∂I
∂I
in which the first inequality follows because Π∗ (I, J, Z) has increasing differences in (I, J) and concave in
OSLA
OSLA
, HM ) is
. Hence, G(IH,t
I by Lemma A-2, and because f (It , Jt , Zt ) ≥ gt (It , Jt Zt ) + HM when It = IH,t
OSLA
/dHM ≥ 0
increasing in HM . Therefore, dIH,t

(ii) Consider the derivative of the function with respect to HT :
∂gH (f (I, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt )) − h(gH (I, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))
∂HT


∂Π∗ (gH (I, Jt , Zt ) − w, J + y, Zt+1 ) ∂Π∗ (I − HM − w, J − HT + y, Zt )
= 1+r+
∂I
∂J
∂Π∗ (f (I, Jt , Zt ) − HM − w, J − HT + y, Zt+1 )
≡ G(HT ).
−
∂J
OSLA
OSLA
OSLA
given that Π∗ (I, J, Z) has increasing differences in
, then G(HT ) ≥ 0 at IH,t
, Jt , Zt ) ≤ IH,t
If f (IH,t

(I, J) and is increasing in (I, J) by Lemma A-2, and that ∂Π∗ (I, J, Z)/∂J is independent of Z by assumption.
OSLA
OSLA
. When G(HT ) = 0,
, Jt , Zt ) > IH,t
Next suppose that f (IH,t


∗
∂Π (gH (I, Jt , Zt ) − w, J + y, Zt+1 ) ∂ 2 Π∗ (I − HM − w, J − HT + y, Zt )
0
G (HT ) = − 1 + r +
∂I
∂J 2
2 ∗
∂ Π (f (I, Jt , Zt ) − HM − w, J − HT + y, Zt+1 )
+
∂J 2

2
∂ 2 Π∗ (gH (I, Zt ) − w, J + y, Zt+1 ) ∂Π∗ (I − w − HM , J − HT + y, Zt )
−
∂I 2
∂J
!
∗
∂ Π (f (I,Jt ,Zt )−HM −w,J−HT +y,Zt+1 )
2 ∗
∂ Π (I − HM − w, J − HT + y, Zt )
∂J
=−
∂ Π∗ (I−HM −w,J−HT +y,Zt )
∂J 2
∂J

∂ 2 Π∗ (f (I, Jt , Zt ) − HM − w, J − HT + y, Zt+1 )
+
∂J 2

2
2 ∗
∂ Π (gH (I, Jt , Zt ) − w, J + y, Zt+1 ) ∂Π∗ (I − w − HM , J − HT + y, Zt )
−
≥ 0,
∂I 2
∂J
in which the inequality follows because

∂ 2 Π∗ (I,J,Z )
∂J 2

∗

/ ∂Π

(I,J,Z )
∂J

is increasing in I by assumption and is inde-

pendent of Z by Assumption 2, because f (I, Jt , Zt ) ≥ I by assumption, and because Π∗ (I, J, Z) is concave in
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I by Lemma A-2. Hence, G(HT ) crosses zero at most once, and if it does, it crosses it from below. Applying
the implicit function theorem to gH (f (ItOSLA , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) − h(gH (ItOSLA , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) thus shows
that there exists a χ such that dItOSLA /dHT ≥ 0 if and only if HT ≥ χ.



Lemma A-7. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and when |Ωt+k | = 1 for all k ≥ 0, if it is optimal to hire in
OSLA
period t, then It ≥ IH,t
.

Proof.

OSLA
Suppose that It < IH,t
. Following the same logic as in Lemma 2, we must then have either that

gH (It , Jt , Zt ) < L, or that Eωt [gH (f (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))] > Eωt [h(gH (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))]. Suppose the latter. By Assumption 2, we thus have that gH (f (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) > h(gH (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ).
Then by (4) and Lemma A-3,
Vt+1 (0, f (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) ≥ δVt+2 (1, gH (f (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ), Zt+2 )
> δVt+2 (1, h(gH (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ), Zt+2 ) = Vt+1 (1, gH (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ),
in which the first inequality follows because hiring is feasible in period t + 1, and the second follows because
Vt+2 (1, It+2 , Zt+2 ) is increasing in It+2 by Lemma A-3. Hence, it is optimal to not hire in period t.



Lemma A-8. Suppose that |Ωt | = 1 for all t. If It ≥ IH,t , in which
OSLA
OSLA
OSLA
, f (I, Jt , Zt ) ≥ IH,t
IH,t ≡ min{I| I ≥ IH,t
+1 , . . . , f (f (· · · f (f (I, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) · · · ), JN −3 , ZN −3 ) ≥ IH,N −2 },

then it is more profitable to hire in period t than in any other period.
Proof.

To simplify notation, define ft (I) ≡ f (I, Jt , Zt ), gt (I) ≡ gH (I, Jt , Zt ), and h(I) ≡ ht (I, Jt , Zt ). Fix

t. Suppose that It ≥ IH,t . The proof proceeds by induction, rolling the horizon N forward, by showing that
it is optimal to hire in period t when the horizon is equal to t + k, k = 2, . . . , N − t. Fix t and suppose that
OSLA
, it is optimal to hire in t when N = t + 2, i.e., ht+1 (gt (I)) > gt+1 (ft (I)).
N = t + 2. Because It ≥ IH,t ≥ IH,t

Suppose next that it is optimal to hire in period t to maximize IN −1 . Hence, we must have that
hN −2 (hN −3 (· · · ht+1 (gt (It )) · · · )) ≥ max{hN −2 (hN −3 (· · · gt+1 (ft (It )), · · · )), hN −2 (hN −3 (· · · ft+1 (ft (It )) · · · )), · · · ,
hN −2 (gN −3 (· · · ft+1 (ft (It )) · · · )), gN −2 (fN −3 (· · · ft+1 (ft (It ))))}.
Because the function hN −1 (I) is increasing by Lemma A-2, we obtain, by applying the function hN −1 (.)
to the induction hypothesis,
hN −1 (hN −2 (hN −3 (· · · ht+1 (gt (It )) · · · ))) ≥ max{hN −1 (hN −2 (hN −3 (· · · gt+1 (ft (It )), · · · ))),
hN −1 (hN −2 (hN −3 (· · · ft+1 (ft (It )) · · · ))), · · · , hN −1 (gN −2 (fN −3 (· · · ft+1 (ft (It )) · · · )))}.
Moreover, we obtain that
hN −1 (hN −2 (hN −3 (· · · ht+1 (gt (It )) · · · ))) ≥ hN −1 (hN −2 (hN −3 (· · · ht+2 (gt+1 (ft (It ))) · · · )))
≥ hN −1 (hN −2 (hN −3 (· · · gt+2 (ft+1 (ft (It ))) · · · ))) ≥ · · · ≥ hN −1 (gN −2 (fN −3 (· · · ft+1 (ft (It )) · · · )))
≥ gN −1 (fN −2 (fN −3 (· · · ft+1 (ft (It )) · · · ))).
OSLA
OSLA
OSLA
since It ≥ IH,t
, ft (It ) ≥ IH,t
+1 , · · · , fN −3 (· · · ft+1 (ft (It )) · · · ) ≥ IH,N −2 . Hence, it is more profitable to hire

in period t when the horizon is equal to N . 
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The necessary condition is obtained from Lemma A-7. The sufficient condition

OSLA
OSLA
is obtained from Lemma A-8 by showing that IH,t = IH,t
. Under Assumption 2 and when Jt = J, IH,t
is

decreasing in Zt as shown in Proposition 3, but is otherwise time-independent. Because Zt+1 ≥ Zt , we have
OSLA
OSLA
OSLA
for the conditions
that IH,t
≥ IH,t
+1 . If moreover f (I, J, Z) ≥ I, it is therefore sufficient to have I ≥ IH,t
OSLA
OSLA
f (I, Jt , Zt ) ≥ IH,t

+1 , . . . , f (f (· · · f (f (I, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) · · · ), JN −3 , ZN −3 ) ≥ IH,N −2 to be satisfied.

Lemma A-9. For any w ≥ FM , gF (I, J, Z) − h(I, J, Z) is decreasing in I.
Proof.

The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma A-4.



Lemma A-10. Suppose that FT = 0. Then gF (I, Jt , Zt ) ≤ h(I, Jt , Zt ) − FM

if and only if

f (gF (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) ≤ gF (h(It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ).
Proof.

The proof immediately follows from the fact that f (I − FM , Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) = gF (I, Jt+1 , Zt+1 ). 
. Then, gF (It , Jt , Zt ) ≥ L since Π∗ (I, J, Z) is increasSuppose that It > I OSLA
F,t

Proof of Lemma 3.

OSLA

ing in I by Lemma A-2. Suppose that It < I F,t
gF (I

OSLA
F,t

, Jt , Zt ) − h(I

OSLA
F,t

. Under Assumption 3, gF (It , Jt , Zt ) − h(It , Jt , Zt ) ≥
OSLA

, Jt , Zt ). By definition, gF (I F,t

wise we would have had f (gF (I

OSLA
F,t

, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) < gF (h(I

Hence, gF (I, Jt , Zt ) ≥ h(I, Jt , Zt ) − FM for all I ∈ [It , I

OSLA
F,t

OSLA

, Jt , Zt ) ≥ h(I F,t
OSLA
F,t

, Jt , Zt ) − FM , for other-

, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) by Lemma A-10.

]. By Lemma A-10, we must thus have that

Eωt [f (gF (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt )) − gF (h(It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , φt (Zt , ωt ))] ≥ 0.



Lemma A-11. Under Assumption 3 and when |Ωt+k | = 1 for all k ≥ 0, if it is optimal to fire in period t,
OSLA

then I OSLA
≤ It ≤ I F,t
F,t
Proof.

.

Suppose that It < I OSLA
. Because Π∗ (I, J, Z) is increasing in I, gF (It , Jt , Zt ) < L, i.e., the firm
F,t
OSLA

goes bankrupt if it fires. Suppose next that It > I F,t

. Following the same logic as in Lemma 3, we must

then have that h(It , Jt , Zt ) − FM > gF (It , Jt , Zt ). Then by (4) and Lemma A-3,
Vt+1 (1, h(It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) ≥ δVt+2 (0, gF (h(It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ), Zt+2 )
> δVt+2 (0, f (gF (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ), Zt+2 ) = Vt+1 (0, gF (It , Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ),
in which the first inequality follows because firing is feasible in period t + 1, and the second follows because
Vt+2 (1, It+2 , Zt+2 ) is increasing in It+2 by Lemma A-3. Hence, it is optimal to not fire in period t.
Proof of Proposition 6.



The necessary condition is obtained from Lemma A-11. Similar to Lemma A-8,

one can show that it is more profitable to fire that employee in period t rather than in any other future period
OSLA

if I OSLA
< It < I F,t
F,t

OSLA

OSLA

, h(It , Jt , Zt ) < I F,t+1 , · · · , h(h(· · · h(h(I, Jt , Zt ), Jt+1 , Zt+1 ) · · · ), JN −3 , ZN −3 ) ≤ I F,N −2 .
OSLA

OSLA

OSLA

If h(I, Jt+k , Zt+k ) ≤ I and if I F,t+k+1 ≥ I F,t+k for all k ≥ 0, it is then sufficient that I OSLA
< It < I F,t
F,t
those conditions to be satisfied. By Proposition A-1, I
Jt+k ≥ Jt and FM ≥ w.

OSLA
F,t+k+1

≥I

OSLA
F,t+k

for

is satisfied when either Jt+k = Jt or



Proposition A-1 (Sensitivity of OSLA Firing Policy). Suppose that Assumption 3 holds. Then,
I

OSLA
F,t

OSLA

is decreasing in Jt and Zt , and increasing in FM . On the other hand, I F,t

is decreasing in FM and,

if FM ≤ w, is increasing in Jt , and when Assumption 2 holds, is independent of Zt .
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Proof of Proposition A-1.

The proof applies the implicit function theorem to the following equations:
OSLA

gF (I OSLA
, Jt , Zt ) = L and gF (I F,t
F,t

OSLA

, Jt , Zt ) − h(I F,t

, Jt , Zt ) + FM = 0. Consider first gF (I OSLA
, Jt , Zt ) = L.
F,t

The left-hand side is increasing in It by Lemma A-2, and therefore decreasing in FM , and also increasing
OSLA

in Jt and Zt . Consider next gF (I F,t

OSLA

, Jt , Zt ) − h(I F,t

, Jt , Zt ) + FM = 0. By Assumption 3, the left-hand

side is decreasing in It . The left-hand side is decreasing in FM and, under Assumption 2, independent of Zt .
When FM ≤ w, the left-hand side is increasing in Jt by Lemma A-2. 

